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Consent to Elective Surgery Valid Even If Doctor
Didn't Warn of Known Risks

In Young v. Yarn,' the Georgia Court of Appeals interpreted the Georgia
Medical Consent Law' as not requiring a physician to warn a patient of
the known risks of elective surgery for the patient's consent to be valid. The
court thus decided that the doctrine of informed consent does not exist in
Georgia as between patient and physician. 3
The plaintiff, Mrs. Maxine Young, engaged the defendant, Dr. Charles
P. Yarn, a specialist in plastic and reconstructive surgery, to perform a
meloplasty (facelift).4 While the defendant did render a general explanation of the procedures involved, he did not advise her of the possibility of
hypertrophic scarring;5 instead, he encouraged her to undergo the surgical
process which resulted in the permanent disfigurement of her face., Dr.
Yarn later testified that he was aware of the risks of hypertrophic scarring
associated with this type surgical procedure,7 but the chance of such scarring occurring in this procedure was assessed by him to be about one-half
of one percent. Other expert testimony, however, indicated that hypertrophic scarring could be expected to occur to some degree in approximately ten percent of those cases wherein a meloplasty is performed.
In her complaint before the Fulton County Superior Court, the plaintiff
alleged that the physician had breached his duty to her by failing to advise
her of the risks associated with this type of procedure. His breach, she said,
induced her to undergo elective surgery to which she would not have consented had full disclosure of the known risks been made." At the close of
plaintiff's evidence, the trial judge granted defendant's motion for a directed verdict," and this appeal followed.
Informed consent between patient and physician is based on the princi1. 136 Ga. App. 737, 222 S.E.2d 113 (1975).
2. Ga. Laws, 1971, p. 438 at 441, GA. CODE ANN. §88-2906 (1971).
3. 136 Ga. App. at 738-39, 222 S.E.2d 114.
4. Brief for Appellant at 2.
5. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY, Second Unabridged Lawyers Ed. 770 (1966) defines
hypertrophy as follows: "Overgrowth; general increase in bulk of a part or organ, not due to
tumor formation. By some restricted to denote greater bulk through increase in size, but not
in number, of the individual tissue elements; by others used to denote an increase in size in
order to meet a demand for increased functional activity." (Evidently, the surgical procedure
left Mrs. Young with large unsightly scars on her face at the point of the incisions.)
6. Brief for Appellant at 1-2.
7. Id. at 2.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 4.
10. 136 Ga. App. at 737, 222 S.E.2d at 114.
11. Id., 222 S.E.2d at 114.
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pie that "a consent to a treatment or diagnostic test obtained without
disclosure of the hazards or dangers involved is no consent.' ' 12In order for
the patient to give an intelligent and informed consent to an elective surgical procedure, he must be made aware of, among other things, the risks so
that he may more fully comprehend the meaning of his consent." As
Justice Cardozo stated, "[E]very human being of adult years and sound
mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body."'"
Although long recognized in other states, 5 the doctrine of informed consent had received little attention in the Georgia courts before Young. The
first Georgia case to deal with the doctrine, Mull v. Emory University,
Inc.," left unanswered the question of the applicability of this doctrine in
Georgia. Mull merely held that where the doctrine was applicable, it applied only to those situations in which a correct and proper procedure of
diagnosis or treatment was involved. 7
In Pierce v. Dowman,5 the court of appeals placed a second condition
upon the applicability of the informed-consent doctrine, but still refrained
from deciding whether it was the law in Georgia. In its one-page opinion
in Pierce, the court held that if informed consent existed in Georgia, the
plaintiff would be required to show by expert testimony that the hazard
complained of was a known risk of the treatment.'9 The requirement estab12.

Mull v. Emory University, Inc., 114 Ga. App. 63, 65-66, 150 S.E.2d 276, 292 (1966).

13. D.

LOUiSELL

& H.

WILLIAMS, TRIAL OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASES

§22.01 (1960) states

that: "In the absence of any emergency that necessitates immediate medical action, and
where the patient is competent and in possession of his faculties, a physician who proposes
to perform a medical or surgical procedure is under an obligation to explain the procedure to
the patient and to disclose the dangers incident to it, so that he may make an intelligent and
informed choice as to whether to consent. When the circumstances permit, the patient should
be told (1) the diagnosis, (2) the general nature of the contemplated procedure, (3) the risks
involved, (4) the prospects of success, (5) the prognosis if the procedure is not performed, and
(6) alternative methods of treatment, if any."
14. Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 126, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914).
15. See Annot. Malpractice: Physician'sDuty to Inform Patient of Nature and Hazards
of Disease or Treatment, 78 A.L.R. 2d 1028 (1961) and cases cited therein. It should be noted,
however, that even those states which apply the doctrine of informed consent do not impose
a duty to inform of minor risks. For example, in Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 229, 502 P.2d 1 (1972),
the California court stated that there is no duty to disclose minor risks, risks of very low
incident, or commonly known risks.
16. 114 Ga. App. at 63, 150 S.E.2d at 276.
17. The court stated: "Whether or not the 'informed consent' rule is applicable in this
state, such rule, if applicable, applies only to the duty to warn of the hazards of a correct
and proper procedure of diagnosis or treatment, and has no relation to the failure to inform
of the hazards of an improper procedure." 114 Ga. App. at 66, 150 S.E.2d at 292. This
statement was also quoted by the court in Irwin v. Arrendale, 117 Ga. App. 1, 7, 159 S.E.2d
719, 725 (1967). However, since Irwin involved injuries allegedly sustained when a prisoner
at the prison hospital received x-rays to which he did not consent, it may be distinguished
from the purely elective situation which existed in Young.
18. 135 Ga. App. 783, 219 S.E.2d 8 (1975).
19. The court stated: "The informed consent rule, if applicable in this state, requires that
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lished in Pierce was clearly met, however, in Young where expert testimony
established that hypertrophic scarring was a known hazard of meloplasty. 0
These decisions appear to be the only cases prior to Young which discuss
the doctrine of informed consent in Georgia. A case after Young dealing
with informed consent is Kenney v. Piedmont Hospital,2' which was
handed down by the same division of the court that decided Young. In
Kenney, however, the physician disclosed to his patient the risks, including a numerical statistic of the chances of death occurring. 2 Therefore, the
Kenney case, which merely cites Young for the proposition that there is
no duty of the physician to disclose the risks involved,2 3 was not a proper
case in which to allege the doctrine of informed consent.
In Young, the court put to rest the question whether informed consent
exists in Georgia. 21 In reaching this decision, the court construed the Georgia Medical Consent Law25 to be dispositive of the informed-consent question.26 The court first noted that Georgia's medical-consent statute was not
controlling, since the consent form in Young did not disclose the general
terms of treatment as required by the statute. 2' Nevertheless, the court
held that the statute was an indication of legislative intent concerning the
duty of a physician to disclose known risks in order to validate the consent
obtained from the patient. 8 The wording of the statute, "discloses in general terms the treatment or course of treatment," 29 was held not to require
disclosure to the patient of the known risks of elective surgery. "0 In reaching
that conclusion, the court adopted the definition of "treatment" in BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY: 3' "A broad term covering all steps taken to effect a cure
of an injury or disease; the word including examination and diagnosis as
well as application of remedies. 32 The court concluded that disclosure of
the plaintiff establish by expert testimony that the hazard is a known complication of the
procedure involved." Id., 219 S.E.2d at 9.
20. Brief for Appellant at 2 and 4.
21. 136 Ga. App. 660, 667, 222 S.E.2d 162 168 (1975). See also McMullen v. Vaughn, 138
S.E.2d
,
(1976) which reiterates that the doctrine of inGa. App. 718, 721, __
formed consent is not a viable principle of law in Georgia.
22. Id. at 660, 222 S.E.2d 162 at 164.
23. Id. at 667, 222 S.E.2d at 168.
24. 136 Ga. App. at 738-39, 222 S.E.2d at 114.
25. This statute, codified at GA. CODE ANN. §88-2906 (1971), states in pertinent part: "A
consent to medical and surgical treatment which discloses in general terms the treatment or
course of treatment in connection with which it is given and which is duly evidenced in
writing and signed by the patient or other person or persons authorized to consent pursurant
to the terms hereof, shall be conclusively presumed to be a valid consent in the absence of
fraudulent misrepresentations of material facts in obtaining the same."
26. 136 Ga. App. at 738, 222 S.E.2d at 114.
27. GA. CODE ANN. §88-2906 (1971).
28. 136 Ga. App. at 738, 222 S.E.2d at 114.
29. GA. CODE ANN. §88-2906 (1971).
30. 136 Ga. App. at 738, 222 S.E.2d at 114.
31. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1673 (4th ed. 1957).
32. Id., citing Hester v. Ford, 221 Ala. 592, 130 So. 203 (1930).
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the general terms of treatment did not include disclosure of the known
risks of treatment."3 Consequently, since the appellant could not sustain
her action alleging that the physician had breached his3 duty to inform her
of known risks, her consent was not rendered invalid.
Additionally, the court upheld a directed verdict for the defendant on
the allegation that the surgical procedure had been negligently performed.3 1 In so doing, the court relied upon the principle established in
Pilgram v. Landham3 6 to the effect that the presumption of care, skill and
diligence of surgeons may be overcome only by expert testimony. 7 Finally,
rejecting the plaintiff's contention that the defendant breached an implied
warranty to her,31 the court cited Bryan v. Grace3 for the principle that a
physician or surgeon "is not an insurer or warrantor that the exercise of
his professional judgement will effect a cure of the patient." 0
The method employed by the Court of Appeals of Georgia to find that
the informed-consent doctrine does not exist in this state is, to say the

least, perplexing. The court's reliance on BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY for the
definition of "treatment" used in deciding Young is equally unfathomable." If BLACK'S is to be used as authoritative source material for our
appellate courts in Georgia, it would seem that the definitions of "disclose"
and "consent" would be equally binding upon the courts in their interpretation of Georgia's medical-consent law.4" "Disclose" is defined as meaning
"to bring into view by uncovering, to lay bare, to reveal to knowledge, to
free from secrecy or ignorance, or to make known. 4' 3 Obviously, this raises
the question whether disclosure has occurred when the physician has failed
to reveal to the patient the known risks that would enable a patient to
carefully consider all pertinent facts and then give a truly voluntary and
informed consent. "Consent" is defined as meaning "a concurrence of
wills; voluntarily yielding the will to the proposition of another; acquiescense or compliance therewith; agreement; the act of coming into harmony
or accord."" This definition gives rise to the question how one may volun33. 136 Ga. App. at 738, 222 S.E.2d at 114.
34. Id. at 739, 222 S.E.2d at 114.
35. Id., 222 S.E.2d at 115.
36. 63 Ga. App. 451, 11 S.E.2d 420 (1940).
37. Id. at 454, 11 S.E.2d at 423. In Young it was shown by expert testimony that cutting
away too much skin or underlying tissue could cause the complained of hypertrophic scarring.
However, there was no expert testimony in Mrs. Young's case that Dr. Yarn negligently cut
away too much skin or tissue. 136 Ga. App. at 739, 222 S.E.2d at 115.
38. 136 Ga. App. at 739-40, 222 S.E.2d at 115.
39. 63 Ga. App. 373, 11 S.E.2d 241 (1940).
40. Id. at 379, 11 S.E.2d at 244.
41. 136 Ga. App. at 738, 222 S.E.2d at 114.
42. GA. CODE ANN. §88-2906 (1971).
43. BCiCK's LAW DICTIONARY 551 (4th ed., 1957), citing State v. Krokston, 187 Mo. App.
67, 172 S.W. 1156, 1157 (1915).
44. Id. at 378, citing Twin Ports Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 26 F. Supp. 366, 371 (D.C. Minn.
1939).
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tarily yield his will to the proposition of another when it is not known what
is contained in the proposition. It seems axiomatic that one has not voluntarily aligned his will with the proposition of another when all factors of
the proposition have not been made known. How may one consent to that
of which he is not aware? In short, "a consent to a treatment or diagnostic
test obtained without disclosure of the hazards or dangers involved, is no
consent.""
It is likely that had the analysis made by the court of appeals turned on
the definition of either "consent" or "disclose" in determining the meaning
of Georgia's medical consent law, the court would have recognized the
existence of the informed-consent doctrine in Georgia. The holding in
Young appears to have been the result of merely choosing to note the
definition of one word to the exclusion of an arguably more applicable word
and basing the decision on that definition.
The manner in which the decision was reached in Young leaves the
impression that perhaps the Court of Appeals has heard the cries of "malpractice crisis" raised by physicians and their insurors and has heeded
those cries by judicially denouncing the informed-consent doctrine in
Georgia. The holding in Young that a physician has no duty to warn his
patients of the known risks of an elective surgical process creates an extremely unjust situation for poorly informed patients who, in most instances, would not have rendered their consent for the elective surgery if the
risks had been made known to them. One cannot consent to that of which
he is not aware; it follows then that the patients cannot be held to have
consented to the risks of surgery if they are not informed of these risks. Not
only does the decision in Young allow a physician to perform elective
surgery upon patients with, at best, only questionable consent, but it may
also be viewed as the abridgement of the plaintiffs rights in a suit against
a physician. As the law presently stands, a physician may induce or encourage a patient to undergo risky yet unnecessary surgery without making
known the attendant risks. The uninformed patient is left without remedy
if the procedure results in death or disfigurement, unless the physician is
negligent in performing the surgery.
Informed consent has its roots in the right to control what happens to
one's own body. In Young, the court took this right from the patient and
inappropriately placed it in his physician; it leaves the patient with no
satisfactory remedy when he is damaged or disfigured by elective surgery,
the risks of which were not fully disclosed to him before obtaining his
consent. The court or the legislature should correct this error quickly.
RICHARD
45.

114 Ga. App. at 65-66, 150 S.E.2d at 292.
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